This week we are excited to announce a new privacy-awareness raising project. We demonstrate how websites can detect two aspects of your online behavior:
Websites may collect these pieces of information for various reasons; either to track you, or to learn more about you.
Why? Well, the main goal of online tracking is to identify website visitors across websites. Trackers recognize visitors by reading unique user’s identifier stored in cookies, or by identifying a unique collection of user’s device characteristics: this is called device fingerprinting. Such unique collection of device’s properties, or a fingerprint, can often uniquely identify the user who visited the website. Usually, fingerprint includes technical parameters like what browser and operating system a visitor is using, what timezone she is from or what fonts she has in her system.
Beyond pure technical characteristics, which are not explicitly chosen by the user, users can be identified by more “behavioral” characteristics, such as the browser extensions they installed and websites where they have logged in. Detecting extensions and website logins can clearly make a significant contribution to fingerprinting — and we would not like to arrive to the point, where websites can track us based on our behavior.
This would be especially worrisome for pro-privacy people: the more extensions you install to your browser, the more trackable you are.
There could be more reasons for detecting your extensions and logins, which are beyond tracking (as tracking is mostly used for behavioral advertising and dynamic pricing). For example, a website would like to learn more about you by spying on your extensions and learning whether you have installed an adblock or not. With the method we featured in our test, this can be done even if the extension is disabled for the given page.
A website could also learn about your behavior and (somewhat private) preferences, in case you are logged in specific shopping, dating or health-related websites. Another possible scenario is if you work at a society, institution or a company that you don’t want the world to know. However, if you log in to your company intranet, there is a chance, that it could be detected and your workplace be learned. (Like for people working for Inria this can be detected, at least at the time of writing.) You might also not want to share with arbitrary websites that you are logged in to certain shopping sites, or to more sensitive services concerned with dating or your health.
The goal of our experiment is to change the status-quo by spreading the word about these issues to as many people as possible. This might not happen from one day to another, but we hope it will happen eventually — similarly as it happened for technical fingerprinting attacks, against which regular browsers now take countermeasures.
So, if you are interested, you can check out demo, or you can read to know more about the details.
Browser Extension and Login-Leak Experiment: https://extensions.inrialpes.fr
The extension detection technique exploits that websites can access browser extension resources. For example, a website can try to detect if Ghostery is installed in Chrome by trying to load its images (click to test) or if you have Adblock installed (click to test). These resources are called web accessible resources, and they are needed to provide a better user interface in the browser. In Chrome, extensions have less options to change the UI, thus more extensions use these resources (roughly 13k). In Firefox, extensions have more flexibility to the change the UI, making web accessible resources less common.
For the login detection we use two methods: redirection URL hijacking and we also use Content-Security-Policy violations. Let’s discuss them in this order.
Redirection URL hijacking. Usually, when you try to get access to a restricted page on a website, you are dropped to the login page if you are not logged in already. In order to make your life easier, these login pages remember the URL of the rejected page, and they plan to drop you there after logging in properly. This is where our attack comes in: we change this URL, so you’ll land on an image if already logged in.
More technically speaking, if we embed an <img> tag pointing to the login page with the changed URL redirection, two things can happen. If you are not logged in, this image will fail to load. However, if you are logged in, the image will load properly, and we can detect this, even though we are a third-party site here.
Abusing Content-Security-Policy violation for detection. Content-Security-Policy, or CSP in short, is a security feature designed to limit what the browser can load for a website. For example, CSP can be easily used to block injected scripts on forums. If there is an attempt like that, the resource will not load, and the browser can also be instructed to report such violation attempts to the server backend.
However, we can also use this mechanisms for login detection, if there are redirections between subdomains on the target site depending on whether you are logged in or not. Similarly, we can embed an <img> tag pointing to a specific subdomain (and page) on the target website, just wait if a redirection happens or not (which would violate our artificial CSP constraints).
If you want to protect yourself from websites seeing which extensions you use, the only advice we can give for the moment is to switch to another browser. For example, in Firefox only few extensions are detectable. You could use other browsers too, but we can’t tell which one would be the best in terms of protection: it has not yet been evaluated.
The good news are: blocking login detections is easy — all you need to do is to disable third party cookies in your browser. Some tracking blocking extensions, such as Privacy Badger could also help — but don’t forget: the more extensions you install, the more trackable you’ll be.
I am thankful to Nataliia Bielova reviewing a draft version of this post.