Privacy breaches through profiling constitute a considerable threat to users of Web 2.0 services. While many concepts have been proposed to address this issue by allowing users to encrypt, obfuscate, or otherwise conceal information of their choice, all have certain limitations. In this paper, we survey the available solutions, and propose a taxonomy for classifying them based on a revised evaluation scheme that builds upon our previous work. Our main contribution is a model that harnesses steganographic techniques in order to hide sensitive data, and the description of a proof-of-concept implementation thereof that allows a user to hide profile data on a website without installing any sort of software aside from a conventional web browser.
Voluntary disclosure of personal information is becoming more and more widespread with the advent of Web 2.0 services. Publishing such information constitutes new kinds of threats, such as further reinforcing already existing profiling techniques through correlation of perceived user activities to those publicly disclosed, but the most obvious of all is the intrinsic threat that malicious third parties collect and combine information we publish about ourselves. In this paper, we evaluate currently existing solutions that are destined for ad-dressing this issue, then propose a model of our own for pro-viding access control for a user over information she published and analyse our implementation thereof.